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SCALE AND SCOPE ECONOMIES IN RURAL BANKING : EVIDENCE 
FROM BANGLADESH 
ABSTRACT 
A system of cost equations is estimated for rural bank branches in Bangladesh using two 
different approaches to measure bank costs and output There were significant differences 
in results obtained under the production and intermediation approaches. The average bank 
branch displayed decreasing returns to scale under the intermediation approach. 
SCALE AND SCOPE ECONQMIES IN RURAL BANKING: EVIDENCE FROM 
BANGLADESH 
The movement during the past few years towards development of banking systems in less-
developed countries, especially in the rural areas, has raised questions concerning the long-run 
viability of these institutions. A number of issues have beeJ'! identified (Meyer and Srinivasan): 
Are the margins authorized for financial institutions sufficient to cover costs? Are the level of 
subsidies required to support institutions too large to be sustained by their governments? Are there 
economies of scale in financial intermediation in developing countries? Are loan loss reserves and 
interest margins adequate to cover projected loan losses? 
There are several cost constraints that affect banks in the rural areas of developing 
countries. Rural banks are more seasonal in lending and deposit-talcing than other banks. The 
nature of risk, timing of payments, amount of loans, and customer relationships are also generally 
different from other banks. Perhaps even more important than these characteristics are the cost 
implications of the regulatory environment in which many banks operate. Policies such as reserve 
requirements, interest rate controls, and credit allocation that are designed to achieve certain 
economic objectives can also increase intermediation costs. Rediscounting is commonly used to 
subsidize rural credit and to partly off set the higher costs resulting from other policy instruments. 
An important objective for the financial sector should be a steady decline in intermediation costs so 
interest rates charged to borrowers are decreased and returns to savers are increased. 
In the recent past, a few studies have been conducted to estimate the costs of financial 
intermediation in developing countries. The consensus that emerges from this research is that 
resource costs of financial intermediation are significant and the viability of many banks may be 
threatened if these costs are not covered (Cuevas). These studies, by and large, focus on the non-
financial costs incurred by financial institutions. The traditional approach, termed the "production 
approach", is appropriate for answering questions regarding the operational efficiency of banks. 
However, it has severe limitations in evaluating the viability of banks, since interest expenses are 
ignored in the estimation of the cost function. As a result, cost properties such as economies of 
scale and scope may be biased. 
This paper proposes to use an alternative approach - the "intermediation approach" - to 
examine the economic viability of a sample of rural bank branches in Bangladesh. I Financial as 
well as non-financial costs incurred by banks are considered and the resulting cost characteristics 
are compared with those obtained from the traditional approach. This new approach also adjusts 
for any biases in scale and scope economy estimates due to differences in the size and mix of 
sources of funds across banks, an important consideration because many institutions receive a 
large amount of their resources from central banks. The Bangladesh case is especially interesting 
because the banking system is heavily regulated and there do not appear to be any studies 
evaluating the rural intermediation costs of financial institutions. 
This paper begins with a brief discussion of some of the key regulatory policies influencing 
rural banking in Bangladesh. The second and third sections describe the model, data and empirical 
results. Some concluding remarks follow. 
RURAL BANKING IN BANGLADESH 
The rural financial system in Bangladesh is dominated by the four nationalized commercial 
banks (NCBs)-Agrani, Janata, Rupali, Sonali-and the agricultural development bank, 
Bangladesh Krishi Bank (BKB). The NCBs are active both in lending and deposit mobilization, 
and have branches throughout the country. BKB, on the other hand, specializes in making 
agricultural loans (although it does accept deposits), and is confined to rural operations. Among 
the policies that have been used to shape the direction of the financial system and control its 
activities, the branching policies of the Bangladesh Bank (the central bank) probably have the 
greatest influence on the rural operations of these banks. From 1977 until 1981, a "two-for-one" 
branching policy was in effect which required commercial banks to open two new rural branches 
for each new urban branch licensed. As a result, the number of rural bank branches increased 
l Viability as defined here does not include default risk considerations. 
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three-fold from 1977 to 1982 (Khalily, Meyer and Hushak). There is speculation that the rural 
branch expansion was intended to serve as a conduit for the allocation of agricultural credit to target 
groups. The policy may also have had the effect of reducing customer-incurred transaction costs in 
the rural areas. However, the economic viability of these branches is open to question. 
The interest rate policy, which has consisted of a combination of ceilings on lending rates 
and higher deposit rates, has resulted in less favorable interest spreads for rural than for urban 
branches. There are two major implications of this interest rate structure. First, it is a disincentive 
for branches to aggressively mobilize rural deposits for rural lending. Second, if this rate structure 
does not cover operating costs, banks must subsidize rural operations with more profitable urban 
operations. 
Finally, the Bangladesh Bank has made active use of refinance polices in the field of rural 
credit. Perhaps this policy was intended to offset the disincentives of higher deposit rates on rural 
deposits and lower lending rates on rural loans. For example, during the early 1980s, rural credit 
could be refinanced up to a maximum of 50 percent of loans made at an interest rate of 6 percent 
with a maximum lending rate of 12 percent. At the same time, the weighted average bank interest 
rate paid on all deposits was 7 to 7 .5 percent Thus it was logical for banks to mobilize rural 
deposits for urban lending and use refinance funds rather than deposits for rural lending. 
1HE MODEL 
The approach used in this paper was to estimate a translog cost function for a sample of 
branches in which costs are assumed to be dependent on output levels and input prices (Benston, 
Berger, Hanweck, and Humphrey; Murray and White). The general form of the translog can be 
written as follows, 
m n mm 
In C =Clo+ L cxi In qi+ L J3j In Pj + Yi LL 'Yik In qi In qk 
i=l j=l i=lk=l 
n n m n 
+Yi.LL, Aj 5 lnpjlnp5 +.L,.L,eijlnqilnPj (1) 
j=l s=l i=l j=l 
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where Cli is the quantity of the ith output, Pj is the price of the jth input, and ln denotes natural 
logarithm. It is possible to derive a system of cost-share equations directly from the translog cost 
function by differentiating (1) with respect to Pj· 
M·=pjxj=dlnC 
J c dlnpj 
n m 
or Mj= ~j+ L A.j 5 lnp 5 + L0ijlnqi 
s=l i=l 
where Mj is the cost share of the jth input. 
(2) 
Among the economically important properties that can be derived from the cost function are 
economies of scale and scope, and the average and marginal costs of lending and deposit 
mobilization (Benston et al.; Mester; Murray and White). In this study, overall economies of scale, 
S, are defined as, 
S=f dlnC 
i=l a In qi 
m m m m n 
ors= :Lai+ L L'Yiklnqk+ I,:LaijlnPj (3) 
i=l i=l k=l i=l j=l 
Values of S less than one imply increasing returns to scale. Partial economies of scale, Si, can be 
computed from (3) as, 
S· = dlnC 
1 
a In qi 
(4) 
If Si is less than one, then partial scale economies exist. 
Panza.r and Willig have shown that a sufficient condition for economies of scope to exist 
between any two products is the existence of cost complementarities between the products. Cost 
complementarities exist between qi and qk if, 
2 
a c <O 
dqjdqk 
An approximate condition for cost complementarity suggested by Denny and Pinto in terms of the 
parameters of the translog function is, 
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DATA AND DEFINmONS 
The cross-section, time-series data used in the estimation of (1) and (2) were taken from the 
semi-annual income-expense statements of 190 rural bank branches of the four nationalized 
commercial banks and Bangladesh Krishi Bank, during the·years of 1983 and 1984. Quarterly 
data on loans and deposits were obtained from the central bank. In order to evaluate the robustness 
of the scale and scope economies to different methodological approaches used in banking research, 
these measures are evaluated using two ways of measuring bank outputs and costs i.e., production 
vs. intermediation approach (Berger et al.). Under the production approach, banks incur labor and 
capital costs by producing loan and deposit accounts of various sizes. Operating (non-financial) 
costs are specified in the cost function, and number of accounts are used as the output metric, 
while average account sizes are specified to control for other account characteristics (Kolari and 
Zardkoohi). 
Under the intermediation approach, banks intermediate deposits and other borrowings into 
loans and other assets. Total operating plus interest costs are specified and the value of loans and 
deposits measured in takas are the output metric (Sealey and Lindley).2 Under both approaches, 
the value-added criterion is used to determine which of the bank liability and asset categories 
should be treated as bank outputs. For instance, funds borrowed from the head office entail almost 
no operating expenses or value added, and so are treated as intermediate inputs with interest costs 
only. Deposits, on the other hand, are treated as outputs since considerable value added is entailed 
in the form of safekeeping, liquidity, and payments services to depositors. The maintained 
assumption is that borrowed funds entail no scale or scope economies. The empirical results from 
applying the production approach may be termed "operating cost" scale and scope economies, and 
those from the intermediation approach may be called "total cost" scale and scope economies. 
2 Taka is a unit of Bangladeshi cmrency. where TK 25 = $1 during the period under study. 
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The input price definitions are common to both approaches. The price of labor is defined 
as total personnel costs divided by the total number of employees. The unit cost of capital is 
calculated by dividing the sum of capital expenses (rents and depreciation) by the value of deposits 
and loans at the end of the period 
Table 1 gives the mean values of the variables in the sample. Operating costs account for 
approximately half of total costs in Agrani, Janata, and Rupali. In contrast, interest expense 
constitutes a significant portion of total costs in Sonali and BKB. Nearly three-fourths of the total 
cost of BKB branches consists of interest payments on funds borrowed from the head office. 
Labor represents a far greater share of total costs than capital in all banks, reflecting the labor-
intensive technology used in rural banking. The average size of a branch (measured by adding 
deposits and loans) is largest for Sonali and BKB compared to the other three banks, but the 
combination of assets and liabilities is quite different among the banks. Loans exceed deposits by 
a wide margin in BKB, they are roughly equal in Sonali, but deposits exceed loans in the 
remaining NCBs. Average deposit size is particularly small for BKB compared to the other banks, 
while average loan size is fairly similar for all the banks except Agrani. Under the maintained 
assumption that borrowed funds entail no scale or scope economies, the production approach 
would overestimate the economies of scale. The bias is expected to be more pronounced for BKB 
because of its heavy reliance on borrowed funds. 
In the empirical section that follows, the same functional form is applied to the same data 
sets for the five banks for both the production and intermediation approaches to establish what, if 
any, are the qualitative differences between the results of the two approaches. Maximum-
likelihood estimates were obtained by estimating the cost equation (1) and the labor share equation 
(2) using the iterative seemingly unrelated equations (SURE) technique. The share equation 
corresponding to capital was omitted. Restrictions implying homogeneity of degree one in input 
prices and symmetry were imposed. 
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Table 1 
MEAN VALUES FOR 1llE COST FUNCDON VARIABLESW 
BANK 
VARIABLE 
AGRANI JANATA RUPAU SON AU BKB 
Total Cost111 (Tl{) 1,055,278 757,888 849,640 802,026 1,149,764 
Operating Cost (Tl{) 550,860 328,958 461,806 261,244 239,982 
Interest Expense 270,642 319,726 387,834 S40,782S/ 89,692 
(Deposits) (Tl{) 
Interest Expense 233,776 109,204 39,188 820,090 
(Bonowed Funds)!V (TK) 
Price of Labor (TK/cmployec) 19,840 12,186 15,892 12,118 16,226 
Price of Capital (TK)ll 0.0024 0.0036 0.0016 0.0038 0.0012 
Labor Share 0.72 0.73 0.80 0.77 0.81 
Capital Share 0.06 0.14 0.08 0.10 0.07 
Deposits (Tl{) 4,565,000 S,308,674 6,003,013 6,455,717 1,417,470 
Loans Outstanding (Tl{) 3,924,740 3,557,767 3,030,026 6,054,897 12,390,417 
Average Deposit Size (Tl{) 2,080 2,450 2,893 2,988 1,000 
Average Loan Size (Tl{) 4,490 3,496 3,773 3,280 3,832 
Number of Branches 40 43 19 46 42 
II Average for the pooled sample, 1983 and 1984. 
111 Total Cost • Operating Cost+ Jnaaest Expense (Deposits) + Jnttzest Expense (Borrowed Funds). 
'1 Total Inaerest Expense. 
IJI Bmrowed Funds include transfer of deposits from surplus to deficit lnnches IS well IS refinance funds. 
II Capital costs per Ilka of total deposits and loans . 
.. 
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Due to space considerations, the estimated parameters and t-ratios for the ten estimated 
equations (two for each bank) cannot be reported here.3 The R2 were reasonably high and most of 
the parameters were of the expected sign and were significant Using the estimated coefficients of 
the cost function, it is possible to investigate the production .structure of the Bangladeshi banking 
system. 
Table 2 shows that the economies of scale estimates at the sample means (row 1) differ 
vastly under the two approaches. Use of the production approach suggests that the "average" 
Agrani and Rupali branches are in the constant returns to scale range, while operating cost scale 
economies appear to prevail in Janata, Sonali and BKB. Under the intermediation approach, 
however, there are diseconomies of scale at all banks. Further, total cost diseconomies are most 
pronounced at BKB, which interestingly enough also exhibited the highest cost advantage under 
the production approach. There are two plausible explanations for this contrast. First, as 
hypothesized, the production approach involves an innate bias towards economies of scale. 
Measured economies under the production approach are biased by a branch's choice of producing 
deposits or borrowing funds from the head office (in other words expanding the loan portfolio 
without expanding the deposit portfolio). The production approach may find more scale 
economies than appropriate as branches with larger loan portfolios employ a higher proportion of 
borrowed funds. This bias is more pronounced for BKB and is reflected in the estimates for 
overall scale economies under the two approaches. Interest expense on borrowed funds constitutes 
41 percent of total costs in BKB compared with less than 25 percent in the three other banks for 
which data are available. Intermediation approach scale economies are thus moderated by 
borrowings from the head office which have no scale economies by assumption. 
3 For a full discussion of the results see Srinivasan. 
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COST SlRUCIURE OF BANKS IN BANGLADESH 
BANK 
COST CONCEPTil 
AGRANI JANATA RUPALI SON ALI BKB 
(A) PRODUCilON APPROACH 
1. Economies of Scale (S) 0.90 0.82 0.94 0.77 0.67 
F-test for Ho: S = 1 (2.28) (18.10)* (0.30) (91.64)* (84.80)* 
Partial Ecom2mi~s Qf Seal~ 
2. Si. Deposits 0.49 0.46 0.64 0.36 0.14 
3. S2. Loans 0.41 0.36 0.30 0.41 0.52 
4. Share of Deposits in total costs 54.74% 56.04% 68.14% 47.14% 21.37% 
5. Share of Loans in total costs 45.26% 43.96% 31.86% 52.86% 78.63% 
Costs Qf M21:2iliiin& De122si1s 
6. Average Costs 1.59% 1.44% 1.90% 1.09% 0.63% 
7. Marginal Costs 0.78% 0.67% 1.21% 0.40% 0.09% 
Costs of Lcndin& 
8. Average Costs 6.49% 5.49% 6.53% 2.34% 1.06% 
9. Marginal Costs 2.65% 1.99% 1.95% 0.95% 0.55% 
~'rall IntenueniatiQD Cost 
10.A verage Costs 8.08% 6.93% 8.43% 3.43% 1.69% 
11. Marginal Costs 3.43% 2.66% 3.17% 1.35% 0.64% 
12. Cost Complementarities 0.08 0.31 0.02 -0.02 0.34 
t-test for Ho: 'Yik + ai ak = 0 (0.56) (0.62) (0.05) (-0.45) (1.53) 
(B) INTERMEDIATION APPROACH 
1. Economies of Scale (S) 1.26 1.10 t.17 1.20 1.66 
F-test for Ho: S = 1 (38.33)* (8.39)* (4.87)* (31.12)* (110.25). 
fWliaJ Econamics m S~iil~ 
2. Si. Deposits 0.68 0.55 0.73 0.44 0.11 
3. S2. l..oans 0.57 0.55 0.44 0.76 1.55 
4. Share of Deposits in total costs 54.45% 50.10% 62.61% 36.37% 6.57% 
5. Share of Loans in total costs 45.55% 49.90% 37.39% 63.63% 93.43% 
Cslsts Qf hfabili~n& 1&121.2si1s 
6. Average Costs 6.67% 6.53% 4.73% 2.68% 2.87% 
7. Marginal Costs 4.56% 3.61% 3.45% 1.17% 0.31% 
CQsts of Lcndin& 
8. Average Costs 9.13% 10.23% 7.80% 5.67% 4.30% 
9. Marginal Costs 5.22% 5.63% 3.40% 4.32% 6.67% 
~cwl IDICDD~iBllQD Q;m 
1 O.A verage Costs 15.80% 16.76% 12.53% 8.35% 7.17% 
11. Marginal Costs 9.78% 9.24% 6.85% 5.49% 6.99% 
12. Cost Complementarities 0.94 0.03 0.65 0.12 0.42 
t-test for Ho: 'Yik + ai ak = 0 (3.12). (0.38) (1.13) (1.26) (0.84) 
J/ Evaluat~ at the geometric means of the variables in the models. 
• Indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
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The other reason that scale economies may be more quickly exhausted in the intermediation 
approach is that smaller accounts cost more per taka and average account sizes decrease with 
numbers of accounts at the margin for both loans and deposits.4 
The measures for partial economies of scale (rows 2 and 3) under the production and 
intermediation approaches suggest increasing returns to scale in both deposit mobilization and 
lending for all the banks. The only exception is BKB which shows decreasing returns to scale in 
lending under the intermediation approach. This finding reflects heavy reliance by BKB on 
borrowed funds to expand its loan portfolio without expanding its deposit portfolio. 
The shares of lending and deposit mobilization in total costs (rows 4 and 5) are somewhat 
similar for Agrani, Janata, and Rupali banks across the two models. Sonali and BKB, however, 
with their relatively higher dependence on borrowed funds, show a significantly higher share for 
lending costs under the intermediation approach. The patterns observed here are consistent with 
Sonali and BKB's heavy reliance on refinance funds and greater participation in the loan-targeting 
programs of the government designed to expand rural loans. Lower interest rates on rediscount 
funds relative to deposits act as a disincentive for mobilizing deposits. 
As expected, overall intermediation costs are higher under the intermediation approach in all 
cases, ranging from 7 percent to over 15 percent (rows 6-11). These numbers are estimates of the 
minimum interest rate that should be charged for the banks to break-even.5 Only Sonali and BK.B 
can break-even at the interest rate of 12 percent pennined on agricultural loans during the early 
1980s. Note that the marginal costs of lending are higher than the marginal costs of deposit 
mobilization under both approaches. This finding is consistent with the data in Table 1 that show 
average loan size is greater than the average size of a deposit account 
The statistic used to test for cost complementarity (row 12) is not a linear function of the 
estimated parameters; so standard errors were calculated using the approach suggested by 
4 Within a bank, the degree of scale economies was strongly influenced by the size of the branches. Smaller size 
branches were characterized by increasing retlDlls, whereas constant and decreasing returns were found for larger 
branches. 
5 These estimates exclude provision for bad debt, and implicitly assume that all loans made are recovered. 
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LeCompte and Smith concerning the variance and covariance of the product of random variables. 6 
The hypothesis that there were no cost complementarities present for any of the output 
combinations cannot be rejected. In fact, nearly all of the scope estimates are close to zero, 
implying a separable cost function. These results are unexpected because of regulatory constraints 
which force the banks to emphasize agricultural lending at the expense of other potentially 
profitable types of lending activity. Economies of scope potentially arise from the sharing of a 
joint input such as credit information collection. There is anecdotal evidence of minimum loan 
screening by banks in Bangladesh, implying that information obtained through deposit behavior of 
clients is of little value in screening loans. This conjecture is clearly tentative. An alternative 
explanation could involve size. That is, as branch size expands, economies of scope may be 
exhausted. However, this does not adequately explain why all of the point estimates are uniformly 
close to zero. That is, the diseconomies of scope also seem to disappear. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study presents estimates of scale and scope economies, and average and marginal 
costs for a sample of rural bank branches of five major banks in Bangladesh. All these measures 
are evaluated using two different approaches to measuring bank costs and output: the production 
and intermediation approaches, which emphasize operational efficiency and economic viability, 
respectively. Some of the measures were significantly different between the two models, 
suggesting that using results from the production approach alone may lead to biased and 
misleading policy conclusions. 
For instance, the overall scale economies suggest further expansion of bank branches under 
the production approach, while diseconomies prevail under the intermediation approach. There 
was no evidence of scope economies between loans and deposits. Non-cost considerations such 
6 The variance of the product of two random variables x and y is: 
2 2 2 2 _2 2 _2 2 _ _ m 
crl\Y = crx cry(l + p~ + x cry+ y crx + 2xypl\Y 'V crx cry 
and the covariance of xy and another random variable, z, is given by: 
crcxy.z)=y covariance(x,z) + i covariance(y,z). 
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as customer convenience and diversification to reduce risk may explain why banks supply these 
outputs jointly. The estimates of the average interest and operating costs obtained under the new 
approach take into consideration the size and mix of the sources of funds across banks. As the 
discussion in the preceding section suggests, at the then prevailing lending rate for rural loans (12 
percent) three of the five banks had negative spreads. If the costs of default are incorporated into 
the analysis, there is reason to believe that the spreads will ~ even more negative. 
These findings highlight the importance of using the intermediation approach to adjust for 
differences in the size and mix of sources of funds across banks in Bangladesh. The 
intermediation approach focused on the weakness of the rural banking system to sustain itself. 
Rural branches have become little more than retail lending operations, relying on rediscount funds. 
The methods used in this study are also of relevance in other low-income countries characterized 
by branch banking systems. The practice of establishing concessionary rediscount facilities in 
central banks to transfer funds from the government or donors to the ultimate lenders is common in 
less-developed countries. Therefore, the possible bias in the production approach needs to be 
considered in cost function estimation. 
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